Taiwan

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset on Taiwan’s territory is 0.7%, a minimal risk. Taiwan’s unresolved political and security dispute with the People’s Republic of China, its proximity to the mainland, and the possibility that coercion could escalate into an invasion or blockade remain the main long-run drivers. Taiwan’s capable institutions, advanced economy, defensive preparations, and the deterrent effect of likely external involvement constrain that risk.

Recent reporting shows heightened but non-combat Chinese military activity around Taiwan. On September 5, Taiwan reported 20 PLA aircraft sorties, including 12 crossing the median line, alongside six naval vessels and five official ships. China remains the principal potential attacker; Taiwan’s armed forces, Japan, and the United States are the key external actors shaping deterrence and escalation.

The largest uncertainty is whether sustained pressure or an exercise could shift rapidly into a blockade, quarantine, missile attack, or invasion. A lethal incident, prolonged Chinese mobilisation, or direct attacks on Taiwan would raise risk most clearly; continued exercises without attacks, stronger allied coordination, and effective Taiwanese readiness would lower the likelihood of a new onset.