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Silfio country intelligence · CHN
China
7.2% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
1.41B
$19.5T
CNY
Beijing
9.71M km²
Chinese
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The live 12-month probability is 7.2%, representing a high risk. China’s large military and economic capacity can sustain coercive campaigns, while its history of civil war, internal unrest, and armed border disputes shows that political conflict can become violent. The Taiwan dispute and unresolved territorial claims provide persistent pathways to a new conflict affecting Chinese territory.
Recent reporting shows strategic competition continuing without a reported armed attack on China. On 16 October, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Science and Technology proposed expanded export controls covering AI, biopharmaceutical and solar technologies, reinforcing tensions with the United States and other trading partners. Principal external actors include Taiwan, the United States, Japan, the Philippines and India; domestic security institutions remain central to containing internal violence.
The largest uncertainty is whether coercive pressure around Taiwan or maritime disputes produces an unintended exchange that reaches Chinese territory, or whether domestic unrest escalates beyond state control. The clearest risk-raising development would be a lethal confrontation involving Chinese and foreign forces, especially around Taiwan or the South China Sea; sustained diplomatic and military deconfliction would lower the likelihood of onset.
Strategic reasoning
- China’s conflict history and unresolved sovereignty disputes create enduring pathways to armed violence, while strong state capacity and internal security institutions make sustained domestic rebellion difficult.
- Export controls and continuing disputes with Taiwan and regional neighbours show strategic friction, but no supplied report describes fighting on Chinese territory; the relevant risk is a new onset, not conflicts already occurring elsewhere.
Critical indicators
- On 16 October 2026, MOFCOM and MOST issued Announcement [2026] No. 48 for public consultation on expanded controls over AI, biopharma and solar technologies. The measure intensifies economic rivalry but is not itself an armed-conflict onset.
- Polymarket pricing places a China–Taiwan military clash before 2027 at 3.5%, Taiwan invasion by the end of 2026 at 2.1%, and a China–Philippines clash at 23.5%. These contracts indicate concentrated concern around maritime flashpoints, with differing scopes and resolution criteria.
Probability trend
How the China estimate has moved
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in China.
Regional context
China compared with its neighbours and region
China ranks number 48 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Eastern Asia
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
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