Silfio country intelligence · TUN
Tunisia
7.2% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
Population
12.35M
GDP
$57.5B
Currency
TND
Capital
Tunis
Land area
163.61K km²
Official languages
Arabic
Risk assessment
Risk profile
Tunisia’s 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset is 7.2%, representing a high risk. The main long-run supports are the country’s history of mass political unrest since the 2011 revolution, persistent economic pressures, institutional weakening, and declining confidence in political channels. These conditions can turn confrontations between authorities and organised domestic opponents into sustained violence, although Tunisia has not experienced a nationwide armed conflict in the recent period.
Recent reporting shows large demonstrations in Tunis on 17 October led by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), demanding the restoration of democracy and opposing mounting restrictions on freedoms. The protests place the government, security forces, the UGTT, and wider opposition networks at the centre of current tensions. No prediction market was available for Tunisia.
The largest uncertainty is whether political repression and economic hardship produce sustained armed mobilisation rather than further peaceful protest, strikes, or sporadic disorder. Risk would rise most clearly if security-force defections, organised armed opposition, or recurring lethal clashes emerged; credible political concessions, restored civic space, and effective economic relief would lower the likelihood of a new onset.
Strategic reasoning
- Tunisia’s post-2011 history of political upheaval, economic grievances, and weakened institutions provides a sizeable pool of mobilisation, while the absence of recent nationwide armed conflict keeps the principal risk focused on escalation from protest into organised violence.
- The 17 October UGTT-led demonstrations are the clearest current escalatory signal: confrontation over democratic freedoms directly involves a powerful nationwide labour organisation and the state’s security apparatus.
- Continued reliance on mass protest and organised labour action is a stabilising channel relative to armed mobilisation, but that channel could narrow if restrictions intensify or authorities respond with sustained lethal force.
Critical indicators
- On 17 October 2026, large demonstrations in Tunis led by the UGTT demanded restoration of democracy and denounced mounting restrictions on freedoms. The mobilisation shows broad organised opposition but does not itself constitute a new armed conflict.
- Since the 2011 revolution, Tunisia has repeatedly experienced major political protests, strikes, and periods of militant unrest without developing into a sustained nationwide civil war. That history supports attention to escalation pathways while distinguishing current political confrontation from conflict already underway.
Probability trend
How the Tunisia estimate has moved
Probability7.2%7.1%7.0%
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in Tunisia.
Regional context
Tunisia compared with its neighbours and region
Tunisia ranks number 47 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Northern Africa
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
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