Libya

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Libya is 18.3%, representing a high risk. Libya’s history of civil war, militia competition, divided political institutions, and weak state control leaves disputes vulnerable to rapid militarisation. Rival authorities and armed networks in the west and east retain the capacity to mobilise, while unresolved questions over political legitimacy, security control, and resource distribution continue to threaten the fragile calm.

Recent reporting highlights serious coercion in eastern Libya under forces led by Khalifa Haftar. Human Rights Watch says at least 31 people have been executed since late August and warns that 50 detainees at Gernada military prison face imminent execution. Separately, the Azawad Liberation Front’s effort to obtain financial and military support from Benghazi and the United Arab Emirates has increased friction with Algeria, adding an external dimension to Libya’s armed networks.

The main uncertainty is whether repression and foreign-backed manoeuvring remain contained or trigger retaliation, militia mobilisation, or renewed clashes between rival Libyan centres of power. Risk would rise most clearly with sustained fighting between major armed factions or an organised cross-border intervention reaching Libya; it would fall with a durable security agreement that constrains commanders and protects political and judicial processes.