Sudan

Sudan’s 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset on its territory is 24.5%, a critical risk. The country’s history of civil wars, rebellions, coups and weak state institutions leaves repeated pathways to renewed organised violence, while economic collapse and fragmented security forces limit the authorities’ ability to contain local crises. The ongoing national war also leaves extensive arms, rival administrations and unresolved territorial disputes.

Recent reporting highlights the severity and fragmentation of violence already underway. On 5 September, heavy fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and an RSF–SPLM-N alliance was reported near Ed Damazin in Blue Nile; separate attacks and shelling in South Kordofan killed at least 21 people according to medical groups. Investigations also allege that SAF forces developed and used chlorine munitions, while UN-linked reporting describes foreign recruitment and weapons networks supporting the RSF.

The largest uncertainty is whether existing front lines produce a durable ceasefire or open additional theatres involving new armed actors. The clearest risk-raising development would be coordinated advances by the RSF, SPLM-N or other factions into major population centres, or renewed militia mobilisation in areas outside current battle zones. A credible, monitored ceasefire would lower the likelihood of such a new onset; Polymarket gives a 13.0% implied probability of a ceasefire by 31 December 2026.