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Silfio country intelligence · TCD
Chad
35.6% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
Population
21M
GDP
$21.47B
Currency
XAF
Capital
N'Djamena
Land area
1.28M km²
Official languages
Arabic, French
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Chad is 35.6%, a critical risk. Chad’s history of rebellions, coups, civil war, and recurring armed challenges reflects limited institutional resilience and persistent political and security competition. Its low economic capacity and exposed borders further increase vulnerability to renewed internal violence or external spillover.
The strongest recent signal is the 17 October drone strike in Sudan’s West Darfur state, near Bir Siliba and close to Chad’s border. The attack, attributed to the Rapid Support Forces, killed at least 10 civilians and injured five, placing active Sudanese warfare close to Chadian territory and highlighting the danger of cross-border escalation.
The largest uncertainty is whether fighting in Sudan remains geographically contained or creates direct attacks, armed incursions, mobilisation, or destabilising support networks inside Chad. Risk would rise most clearly after a confirmed cross-border strike or renewed organised rebellion in Chad; sustained border control and the absence of armed activity on Chadian territory would support a lower-risk trajectory.
Strategic reasoning
- Chad’s record of armed rebellions, coups, and contested transfers of power makes domestic political crises more capable of becoming sustained violence. Weak state capacity and economic constraints reduce the authorities’ ability to contain such escalation.
- The Sudan war is the clearest current escalatory pressure: active fighting by the Rapid Support Forces near the Chad border creates opportunities for spillover, even though the reported strike occurred in Sudan and does not itself constitute a new conflict onset in Chad.
- The main stabilising factor is that no supplied report describes fighting on Chadian territory or a confirmed armed mobilisation against the Chadian state. This distinction keeps the assessment focused on potential new onset rather than conflict already underway in Sudan.
Critical indicators
- On 17 October 2026, a drone strike in Sanaqit near Bir Siliba, in Sudan’s West Darfur state and close to Chad, killed at least 10 civilians and injured five. The incident shows that high-intensity warfare is occurring immediately beside Chad’s exposed western frontier.
- The reported attack was attributed to the Rapid Support Forces. Its significance for Chad lies in the possibility of cross-border escalation or displacement of armed activity, while the event itself remains outside Chadian territory.
Probability trend
How the Chad estimate has moved
Probability36.3%36.0%35.6%
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in Chad.
Regional context
Chad compared with its neighbours and region
Chad ranks number 5 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.