Silfio country intelligence · TCD
Chad
37.2% annual probability
Population
21M
GDP
$21.47B
Currency
XAF
Capital
N'Djamena
Land area
1.28M km²
Official languages
Arabic, French
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Chad is 37.2%, a critical risk. Chad has a long record of civil wars, rebellions, military power struggles, and weak political institutions. Limited economic capacity, persistent armed mobilisation, and insecurity across its borders leave the state vulnerable to renewed internal fighting or cross-border violence reaching Chadian territory.
The reporting reviewed on 7 September 2026 contains no substantive new development directly involving Chad’s security environment. The principal relevant actors remain the Chadian government and armed opposition networks, alongside Sudanese forces and militias whose conflict creates risks along Chad’s eastern border, and insurgent groups active around the Lake Chad basin.
The largest uncertainty is whether political disputes, border incidents, or regional displacement develop into sustained organised violence inside Chad. Risk would rise through a major rebel attack, a serious Chad-Sudan border clash, or renewed armed contest over national power; it would fall with credible political accommodation, effective border control, and reduced regional conflict spillover.
Strategic reasoning
- Chad’s history of civil war, rebellions, and armed transfers of power means political crises can escalate rapidly when institutions cannot contain elite or regional disputes. The 2021 killing of President Idriss Déby during fighting underscored the continuing danger of armed succession struggles.
- The strongest external escalatory channel is the war in Sudan, which has increased pressure along Chad’s eastern frontier and can transmit weapons, fighters, refugees, and cross-border violence. Fighting involving Chadian forces abroad would not itself count, but an attack or sustained clashes on Chadian territory would.
- Government security control and the absence of a reported new nationwide insurgency are important stabilising factors, while the main unresolved risk is the conversion of border or political tensions into sustained domestic fighting.
Critical indicators
- In April 2021, President Idriss Déby was killed while government forces fought rebels in northern Chad. The episode demonstrated how armed opposition can directly challenge the state and trigger a rapid succession crisis.
- Since Sudan’s war began in April 2023, fighting and displacement near Chad’s eastern border have increased the exposure of provinces such as Ouaddaï and Wadi Fira to weapons flows, armed-group movement, and cross-border incidents.
- The 2005–2010 period of civil war and repeated rebel offensives remains relevant: it shows that Chad’s political disputes have previously produced sustained fighting on its own territory rather than remaining confined to neighbouring states.
Probability trend
How the Chad estimate has moved
Probability37.2%36.5%35.9%
Aug 26
Aug 31
Sep 1
Sep 4
Sep 7
Date
Regional context
Chad compared with its neighbours and region
Chad ranks number 5 of 195 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
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