DR Congo

The 12-month probability is 22.3%, representing a critical risk. The DRC’s history of civil wars, recurring insurgencies, weak state authority, fragmented armed groups, and limited institutional capacity leave it highly exposed to new armed violence. Conflict in the east has also repeatedly enabled political mobilisation, militia proliferation, and cross-border involvement.

Recent reporting shows a potentially significant political expansion of the eastern war. Former President Joseph Kabila has joined a political-military coalition with the M23 rebellion, while Kinshasa alleges that they are preparing a “general attack.” Rwanda remains a central external actor through its alleged support for M23; the DRC government is also using foreign paramilitaries, including forces associated with Erik Prince. These developments concern an existing conflict, but could broaden violence into new areas or draw additional domestic factions into armed confrontation.

The largest uncertainty is whether Kabila’s coalition can translate political alignment into coordinated military operations beyond existing battlefronts. Risk would rise if attacks spread toward major population centres, additional senior officials or commanders defected, or Rwanda became more directly involved; credible ceasefire implementation, demobilisation, and containment of the coalition would lower the likelihood of a new territorial onset.