Belarus

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Belarus is 2.2%, a low risk. Belarus has avoided sustained internal armed violence since independence, while President Alexander Lukashenko’s centralised security system has contained serious political unrest, including the 2020 protest crisis. Its limited economic capacity and deep dependence on Russia remain vulnerabilities, but they also provide Moscow-backed security support that deters many domestic and external challengers.

Recent reporting indicates Russian military facilities remain in Belarus, yet Lithuanian intelligence said on 5 September that it saw no new manoeuvrable units posing a direct threat to Lithuania, Latvia, or Poland. Reporting also portrays Lukashenko as cautious about being tied too closely to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The main actors are Belarusian and Russian authorities, neighbouring NATO states, and Belarus’s security services.

The largest uncertainty is whether Russia’s war, military mobilisation, or a sharp crisis in Moscow could force Belarus into direct participation or provoke domestic instability. Risk would rise with the deployment of substantial new Russian or Belarusian forces, cross-border incidents, or armed opposition inside Belarus; it would remain lower if Minsk preserves its current restraint and neighbouring intelligence continues to find no major military build-up.