Poland

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset on Polish territory is 0.9%, a minimal risk. Poland’s strong state institutions, sizeable economy, NATO membership, and substantial defence capacity deter attack and support crisis management. Its history of invasion and occupation, however, keeps exposure elevated relative to countries without Poland’s position on NATO’s eastern flank.

Recent reporting says military recruitment centres have begun sending mobilisation cards, chiefly to reservists and some civilians with defence-related skills. This is a preparedness measure rather than evidence that fighting has begun. Russia and Belarus remain the principal external security concerns, while NATO allies are Poland’s main source of deterrence and reinforcement. Warsaw’s diplomatic engagement with India also points to continued international cooperation rather than domestic armed confrontation.

The largest uncertainty is whether the war involving Russia and Ukraine produces a spillover, miscalculation, or deliberate attack reaching Polish territory. Risk would rise most clearly after a verified cross-border strike, sustained incursions, or an openly escalatory Russia-NATO confrontation; it would fall with durable regional de-escalation and continued effective alliance deterrence.