Bangladesh

Bangladesh faces a 27.8% probability of a new armed-conflict onset within the next 12 months, representing a critical risk. The main supporting factors are a history of coups, political violence, insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and recurrent confrontation between major political forces. Institutional weakness, polarisation, and the ability of mass mobilisation to overwhelm security and political safeguards also sustain the risk.

Recent reporting offers limited direct evidence of organised armed mobilisation, but it keeps the political consequences of the 2024 uprising in view. A Tribune analysis notes that more than 1,400 people were killed during that upheaval, while Bangladesh continues to take assertive diplomatic positions, including its October 2026 call for UN action over Israel and Palestine. The relevant domestic actors remain the state security apparatus, established political parties, protest networks, and armed groups in the hill tracts.

The largest uncertainty is whether political competition remains within largely coercive but non-war forms or produces sustained armed organisation after a major trigger. Risk would rise through widespread lethal unrest, security-force fragmentation, renewed insurgent activity, or organised violence between rival political networks; it would fall through credible political accommodation, disciplined security institutions, and sustained containment of local armed groups. No prediction market is available.