Cuba

Cuba has a 1.5% 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset, representing a low risk. The country has a history of revolutionary violence and intense confrontation with the United States, including the 1962 missile crisis, but has experienced prolonged internal political control and no recent sustained armed conflict on its territory. Strong state institutions and security forces remain important barriers to organised rebellion.

Recent reporting points to worsening economic and humanitarian pressure rather than active armed mobilisation. U.S. sanctions, restrictions on fuel shipments, and measures targeting Cuba’s BICSA bank are contributing to electricity shortages, constrained supplies, and public frustration. The principal actors are the Cuban government and security apparatus, the Trump administration, and external financial institutions; no reported armed group currently presents a clear territorial challenge.

The largest uncertainty is whether worsening shortages and political pressure could turn unrest into sustained violence, or instead remain manageable through repression, adaptation, and external diplomacy. A major crackdown, elite fracture, organised opposition violence, or direct U.S.-Cuban military action would raise risk; credible economic relief, negotiations, or continued security control would lower the likelihood of onset.