Cuba

The live 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Cuba is 0.9%, representing a minimal risk. Cuba’s long record of one-party rule, strong security institutions, and limited organised armed opposition has generally prevented domestic conflict, although economic weakness, political repression, and past episodes of mass unrest remain relevant vulnerabilities.

Recent reporting shows a worsening humanitarian and economic crisis. New U.S. sanctions targeting oil, banking, mining, and energy are intensifying pressure, while power and water failures have contributed to increased intestinal illness. The principal actors are the Cuban government and security forces, the United States, and a largely unarmed domestic population; reporting does not identify an organised insurgency or interstate fighting on Cuban territory.

The greatest uncertainty is whether prolonged shortages and public anger could overwhelm the state’s coercive and administrative capacity, or instead produce contained protests and further emigration. Risk would rise most clearly with sustained violent demonstrations, defections within the security forces, or direct U.S.-Cuban military action; improved fuel access, economic relief, or continued state control would lower escalation pressure.