Greece

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Greece is 0.8%, representing a minimal risk. Greece has capable state institutions, substantial economic and military capacity, and no current domestic insurgency. Its modern history includes civil war, but that conflict is remote, while membership in NATO and the European Union provides strong deterrence and crisis-management mechanisms.

Recent reporting does not identify an active armed mobilisation or imminent attack on Greek territory. Athens’ explanation on 2026-10-18 that it would not provide Patriot missiles to Ukraine because doing so could compromise Greece’s own defence capabilities reflects continued attention to national security, not a new conflict on Greek soil. A partial-scope Polymarket contract places Greece–Turkey military engagement by 31 December at 4.6%, providing separate context for persistent bilateral tensions.

The largest uncertainty is whether a sudden Greece–Turkey crisis in the Aegean or eastern Mediterranean could escalate beyond political and maritime confrontation into armed action reaching Greek territory. Risk would rise most clearly after a confirmed cross-border attack, sustained military mobilisation, or violent domestic escalation; it would be lower if bilateral disputes remained within diplomacy, deterrence, and established alliance channels.