www.rfi.fr
Silfio country intelligence · TUR
Türkiye
18.4% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
Population
85.88M
GDP
$1.6T
Currency
TRY
Capital
Ankara
Land area
783.56K km²
Official languages
Turkish
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset on Turkish territory is 18.4%, a high risk. Turkey’s history of armed confrontation with the PKK, recurrent political violence, military coups, and instability along its southern and eastern borders supports substantial exposure. Its large security apparatus and state capacity reduce the likelihood that tensions quickly become sustained internal conflict, but do not remove the possibility of escalation.
Recent reporting highlights growing pressure around the Black Sea after attacks on cargo ships in the waters of NATO members Bulgaria and Romania prompted an emergency alliance meeting. Turkey is also seeking Iran’s help to contain fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. These developments concern external theatres, but they could draw Ankara into sharper regional confrontations. Prediction markets imply 7.5% for an Israel–Turkey military clash and 4.6% for Greece–Turkey military engagement by December 31.
The largest uncertainty is whether regional incidents remain outside Turkey or generate retaliation, miscalculation, or militant spillover onto Turkish territory. A confirmed attack inside Turkey, renewed sustained PKK violence, or direct clashes involving Turkish forces near its borders would raise risk; effective containment of Black Sea and Middle Eastern tensions would lower it.
Strategic reasoning
- Turkey’s long record of PKK conflict and political violence means that regional shocks can interact with established domestic fault lines, while strong institutions and security capacity provide important containment.
- The Black Sea shipping attacks and Ankara’s efforts to mediate over the Houthis are the clearest current escalatory signals, but neither constitutes a new conflict on Turkish territory.
- NATO coordination and Turkey’s diplomatic engagement with Iran are stabilising factors because they create channels for managing escalation and reducing pressure for unilateral military action.
Critical indicators
- On October 17, 2026, RFI reported that deadly attacks on cargo ships in Bulgarian and Romanian waters had triggered an emergency NATO meeting on Black Sea security, testing Turkey’s effort to keep warships out of the area.
- In October 2026, Al-Monitor reported that Ankara was working through Tehran to contain fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, highlighting Turkey’s exposure to Middle Eastern escalation while placing the activity outside Turkish territory.
- By October 19, Polymarket priced an Israel–Turkey military clash before 2027 at 7.5% and Greece–Turkey military engagement by December 31 at 4.6%, market signals relevant to interstate escalation but not direct evidence of onset inside Turkey.
Probability trend
How the Türkiye estimate has moved
Probability18.5%18.4%18.4%
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in Türkiye.
Regional context
Türkiye compared with its neighbours and region
Türkiye ranks number 16 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
Related coverage
www.al-monitor.com