Syria

Syria faces a 38.3% 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset, a critical risk. The country’s recent history of civil war, fragmented armed authority, weakened institutions, economic exhaustion, and unresolved territorial and communal disputes leave it highly vulnerable to renewed organised violence. The post-2024 political transition has not removed the risks created by competing domestic forces and external military involvement.

Recent reporting shows several active pressure points: Israeli raids and checkpoint activity in southern Syria, alleged Hezbollah efforts to deploy missile launchers near the Israeli border, Islamic State attacks on energy infrastructure in Deir ez-Zor, and security operations against ISIS and other armed networks. Damascus has also urged the EU to pressure Israel to halt attacks. Prediction markets separately implied 25.0% odds of Israeli military action by 31 October and 7.5% odds of Iranian targeting, while contracts resolving on 30 September were much lower.

The largest uncertainty is whether Damascus can contain armed networks while preventing Israeli, Iranian, or other external actions from producing sustained fighting on Syrian territory. Risk would rise most clearly after a lethal cross-border escalation, territorial seizure, or coordinated insurgent campaign; it would fall with durable de-escalation in the south and demonstrable consolidation of national security control.