Bahrain

The live 12-month probability of a new armed conflict on Bahrain’s territory is 3.2%, a moderate risk. Bahrain’s exposure reflects its position in the Gulf, proximity to Iran, hosting of important regional security facilities, and close alignment with Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. Its history of serious domestic unrest, particularly during the 2011 uprising and subsequent sectarian tensions, also leaves a basis for renewed internal violence if regional confrontation aggravates political and social pressures.

Recent reporting places Bahrain within an escalating regional security environment. The GCC Ministerial Council met in Manama as Saudi Arabia intercepted Houthi missiles and Iran warned firms connected to artificial-intelligence data; separate reporting says Bahrain is tightening money-laundering controls because of risks associated with the Iran war. These developments involve Bahrain directly as a diplomatic and financial-security hub, while Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Houthis, and GCC governments are the principal relevant actors.

The largest uncertainty is whether the wider Iran conflict produces a deliberate or retaliatory strike reaching Bahrain, or stimulates domestic mobilisation. A confirmed Iranian or proxy attack on Bahraini territory, attacks on US-linked facilities, or renewed organised street violence would raise risk; sustained GCC de-escalation, effective security control, and the absence of attacks inside Bahrain would lower it. A Polymarket contract assigns a 29.5% chance to Iran targeting Bahrain by October 31, but its partial scope is separate context rather than a direct measure of this 12-month assessment.