www.timesofisrael.com
Silfio country intelligence · ISR
Israel
5.3% annual probability
10.12M
$610.78B
ILS
Jerusalem
20.77K km²
Arabic, Hebrew
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The live 12-month probability is 5.3%, a high risk. Israel’s extensive history of interstate wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and repeated cross-border escalation sustains exposure to a new armed-conflict onset on its territory. Strong military capacity, effective institutions, and advanced warning and interception capabilities provide important protection, but Israel’s location among active conflict zones leaves limited strategic depth.
Recent reporting shows Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon after Hezbollah drones targeted Israeli troops, while a report citing intelligence sources alleges that Iran is considering a coordinated attack involving Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other allied groups. These developments concern existing regional confrontations, but they could create a distinct new episode if attacks reach Israel from another front. Prediction markets show 84.5% odds that the Israel-Iran ceasefire lasts through September 30 and 70.5% through October 31; they also price a 13.5% chance of an Israel-Turkey clash before 2027.
The largest uncertainty is whether ceasefires and deterrence contain these confrontations or whether Iran-aligned groups coordinate sustained attacks on Israeli territory. Risk would rise most clearly after a mass-casualty attack or direct, repeated Iranian or allied strikes inside Israel; durable ceasefires and restrained responses would lower the likelihood of a new onset.
Strategic reasoning
- Israel’s repeated wars with neighbouring states and sustained confrontations with Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, and other armed groups leave a persistent pathway to renewed fighting, even though its military and institutional capacity can deter or contain attacks.
- The September 6 Hezbollah drone incident and Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon are the clearest escalatory signal. They are principally continuation of existing regional hostilities, but wider retaliation could create a separate onset on Israeli territory.
- Ceasefire arrangements and Israel’s strong defensive capabilities are stabilising factors. Their effectiveness depends on whether Iran-aligned groups and Israel maintain restraint across multiple active fronts.
Critical indicators
- On September 6, 2026, Israel struck southern Lebanon after Hezbollah launched drones at Israeli troops; reports said four people were killed and residents of Arab Salim were urged to evacuate. The incident demonstrates how quickly an existing front can widen.
- A September 2026 report citing Israeli intelligence sources alleged that Iran was planning an “October 7-style” coordinated attack involving Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other allied groups. The allegation is unverified but directly concerns the possibility of simultaneous attacks reaching Israel.
- On September 7, prediction markets priced the Israel-Iran ceasefire continuing through September 30 at 84.5% and through October 31 at 70.5%, while a clash between Israel and Turkey before 2027 was priced at 13.5%. These markets provide separate context on continued regional tension.
Probability trend
How the Israel estimate has moved
Aug 26
Aug 31
Sep 1
Sep 4
Sep 7
Date
Regional context
Israel compared with its neighbours and region
Israel ranks number 56 of 195 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
Related coverage

theconversation.com