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Silfio country intelligence · MDG
Madagascar
4.6% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
Population
32.74M
GDP
$19.62B
Currency
MGA
Capital
Antananarivo
Land area
587.04K km²
Official languages
French, Malagasy
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Madagascar is 4.6%, representing a moderate risk. Madagascar’s history of political crises, including the 2009 coup and recurring contested transfers of power, reflects weak institutions and a tendency for political disputes to mobilise street protesters, security forces, and rival elites. Economic hardship and limited state capacity can further reduce the ability to contain unrest peacefully.
Recent reporting shows that military leader Michael Randrianirina took power after youth-led protests brought down President Andry Rajoelina in October 2025. Rajoelina remains in exile but is reportedly trying to rebuild diplomatic and political support, while public disillusionment persists one year after the uprising. These conditions leave possible friction among the military authorities, the former president’s supporters, youth movements, and other political factions.
The main uncertainty is whether the post-coup authorities can maintain cohesion and absorb opposition without resorting to sustained violence. Risk would rise if Rajoelina’s return efforts triggered mass mobilisation, if security forces split, or if protests became armed. It would fall if the authorities and opposition established a credible political transition and contained unrest without expanding armed confrontation.
Strategic reasoning
- Madagascar’s repeated political crises and past coup experience make disputes over executive power more likely to produce street mobilisation and security-force intervention. Weak institutions and economic grievances can make peaceful bargaining harder.
- The 2025 coup and continuing exile of Andry Rajoelina are the strongest escalatory signals, but the reported conflict remains a political transition rather than a new armed conflict onset. The key stabilising factor is the possibility that military and civilian actors manage the transition without sustained armed violence.
- The greatest danger is fragmentation within the security establishment or the emergence of organised armed factions from political protests. No prediction market for Madagascar was identified.
Critical indicators
- In October 2025, weeks of youth-led protests brought down elected President Andry Rajoelina, after which military leader Michael Randrianirina took power. This marks a major unresolved rupture in Madagascar’s political order, although the takeover itself is not counted as a new future onset.
- On 15–18 October 2026, reporting marking the uprising’s first anniversary described continuing public disillusionment, Rajoelina’s exile and efforts to mobilise diplomatic support, and growing Russian influence. These developments show that political legitimacy remains contested and could raise tensions if opposition mobilisation intensifies.
Probability trend
How the Madagascar estimate has moved
Probability5.1%4.8%4.6%
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in Madagascar.
Regional context
Madagascar compared with its neighbours and region
Madagascar ranks number 60 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
Related coverage
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