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Silfio country intelligence · BOL
Bolivia
0.9% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
12.58M
$64.77B
BOB
Sucre
1.1M km²
Aymara, Guaraní, Quechua, Spanish
Risk assessment
Risk profile
The live 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Bolivia is 0.9%, representing a minimal risk. Bolivia has a history of political crises, coups, mass protest, and episodes of serious unrest, but these have generally stopped short of sustained civil war or insurgency. Its institutional fragility and recurrent political polarisation support some exposure, while the absence of a durable national armed movement keeps the risk below higher categories.
Recent reporting provides no indication of an organised insurgency, imminent coup, foreign military threat, or cross-border attack reaching Bolivian territory. The principal relevant actors are the government, opposition movements, security forces, and socially powerful unions and indigenous organisations; none is currently identified as conducting sustained armed operations. No prediction market for Bolivia was found.
The main uncertainty is whether a future political or economic shock could turn Bolivia’s established protest capacity into prolonged armed confrontation. Risk would rise if security-force defections, armed factional mobilisation, or repeated lethal clashes produced territorial control disputes; it would fall if political competition remains predominantly electoral and demonstrations remain organised around negotiation and non-armed pressure.
Strategic reasoning
- Bolivia’s record of coups, political crises, and mass mobilisation shows that severe instability is possible, but the country has not developed a persistent insurgency or rival armed authority. This supports a limited but non-zero onset risk.
- Current evidence lacks a clear escalatory trigger: there is no reported armed campaign, external attack, or security-force split on Bolivian territory. Fighting involving Bolivian actors abroad would not itself qualify as a new onset in Bolivia.
Critical indicators
- October 2003: the Bolivian gas conflict produced prolonged nationwide protests and deadly clashes that helped force President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada from office. The episode demonstrates how political and economic disputes can generate serious violence without becoming a sustained civil war.
- November 2019: President Evo Morales resigned after weeks of disputed-election protests, opposition mobilisation, and security-force pressure. The crisis exposed coup and escalation risks, but the violence remained episodic rather than developing into enduring armed conflict.
Probability trend
How the Bolivia estimate has moved
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in Bolivia.
Regional context
Bolivia compared with its neighbours and region
Bolivia ranks number 113 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.