Silfio country intelligence · BRA
Brazil
3.2% annual new-conflict probability
How to read these probabilities: Scores estimate the probability of a new armed conflict starting within the next 12 months. Ongoing conflicts can have a saturation effect, reducing the modelled probability of an additional conflict onset. A low or falling score does not imply less severe ongoing fighting or a safer country.
212.81M
$2.28T
BRL
Brasília
8.52M km²
Portuguese
Risk assessment
Risk profile
Brazil has a 3.2% probability of a new armed-conflict onset within the next 12 months, representing a moderate risk. The main supporting factors are intense political polarisation, the country’s large and heavily armed population, persistent organised-crime violence, and a recent history of serious confrontation between political factions. Brazil’s strong state capacity and established institutions nevertheless make sustained nationwide conflict less likely than isolated or short-lived violence.
Recent reporting highlights continuing political tension around the presidential contest. Opposition candidate Flavio Bolsonaro was reported visiting his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is serving a sentence at home for an attempted coup. The principal actors are Brazil’s political factions, federal institutions, and organised-crime groups; no current report indicates an armed campaign seeking territorial control.
The largest uncertainty is whether electoral or judicial confrontation could mobilise sustained violence beyond demonstrations and isolated attacks. Risk would rise if political leaders rejected institutional outcomes, security forces fractured, or organised groups formed durable alliances with political actors. It would fall with broadly accepted electoral procedures, continued civilian control of the security forces, and effective containment of politically motivated violence.
Strategic reasoning
- Brazil’s history includes military rule, political violence, and the 8 January 2023 assault on federal institutions. These episodes show that severe mobilisation can occur, but strong institutions and state capacity continue to constrain escalation into sustained armed conflict.
- The strongest current escalatory signal is the continued prominence of the coup attempt and Bolsonaro-linked political confrontation. The key stabilising factor is the absence of reporting on organised armed groups, territorial seizure, or a security-force split; criminal violence remains distinct from a new nationwide conflict onset.
Critical indicators
- In October 2026, reporting described opposition presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro visiting former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is serving his sentence at home for a coup attempt. The episode underscores the political stakes surrounding the election and the possibility of further polarisation.
- On 8 January 2023, Bolsonaro supporters attacked Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace in Brasília. The riot demonstrated a capacity for serious domestic political violence, while its containment by state institutions also illustrates the barrier to sustained armed conflict.
Probability trend
How the Brazil estimate has moved
Sep 30
Oct 5
Oct 12
Oct 15
Oct 19
Date
Current conflicts
Source: UCDP
No active conflicts in Brazil.
Regional context
Brazil compared with its neighbours and region
Brazil ranks number 72 of 196 in new conflict outbreak risk.
Land neighbours
Figures are each country's modelled probability of a new armed conflict on its territory within the next 12 months. Select any country to open its full profile.
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