Venezuela

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Venezuela is 9.5%, making this a high risk. Venezuela’s weak institutions, severe economic pressures, political polarisation, and history of coups and sustained political violence leave limited safeguards against a serious domestic security crisis.

Recent reporting supplied for this assessment is sparse. The principal external concern is a possible confrontation involving Venezuela, neighbouring Guyana, or armed actors operating near the Colombia border; the Venezuelan government, opposition-linked forces, Colombia, and Guyana would be central actors in any escalation. Polymarket prices a U.S. invasion of Venezuela by December 31, 2026, at 3.4%, a separate market signal focused only on direct U.S. intervention.

The largest uncertainty is whether political and border tensions remain coercive and contained or produce organised, sustained fighting inside Venezuela. Risk would rise with armed clashes involving state forces, opposition groups, Colombian-border armed organisations, or Guyana; it would fall with credible political accommodation, stronger institutional restraint, and durable de-escalation of regional disputes.