Zimbabwe

The 12-month probability of a new armed-conflict onset in Zimbabwe is 2.4%, representing a low risk. The country’s history of politically driven violence, including serious repression around the 2008 elections and the military-assisted leadership change of November 2017, supports continued sensitivity to political shocks. Economic hardship, weak institutions, and the security sector’s longstanding political influence are additional underlying risk factors.

Recent reporting reviewed contains no direct indication of organised armed mobilisation or imminent violence inside Zimbabwe. The available dated development is routine: Zimbabwe is participating in the UAE ODI Tri-Series with Bangladesh and Afghanistan on 19 October 2026. No prediction market is available for Zimbabwe, and there is no current evidence of an interstate confrontation involving Zimbabwean territory or a new domestic armed group.

The main uncertainty is whether a future succession dispute, disputed election, severe economic shock, or breakdown within the ruling and security establishments could convert political contestation into sustained violence. Risk would rise most clearly with attacks between organised domestic factions, military intervention accompanied by armed clashes, or cross-border fighting reaching Zimbabwe; it would be lower with orderly political transitions and continued containment of disputes through institutions.